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The Missing Link-Contribution Without
Common Liability: Nolechek v. Gesuale
New York's contribution statute' allows a defendant a claim
for contribution if "two or more persons . . . are subject to lia-
bility for damages for the same personal injury, injury to prop-
erty or wrongful death."'2 In Nolechek v. Gesuale,3 the New
York Court of Appeals held that a defendant, subject to liability
for a child's personal injuries, has a right to seek contribution
from the parent who entrusted a dangerous instrument to the
child, even though the parent is not liable to his child.4 The con-
tribution statute would require the parent and the defendant to
be liable for the same personal injury-that of the child.6 The
1. N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAW art. 14 (McKinney 1976). This article provides:
Section 1401.
Except as provided in section 15-108 of the general obligations law, two or
more persons who are subject to liability for damages for the same personal injury,
injury to property or wrongful death, may claim contribution among them
whether or not an action has been brought or a judgment has been rendered
against the person from whom contribution is sought.
Section 1402.
The amount of contribution to which a person is entitled shall be the excess
paid by him over and above his equitable share of the judgment recovered by the
injured party; but no person shall be required to contribute an amount greater
than his equitable share. The equitable shares shall be determined in accordance
with the relative culpability of each person liable for contribution.
Section 1403.
A cause of action for contribution may be asserted in a separate action or by
cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party claim in a pending action.
Section 1404.
(a) Nothing contained in this article shall impair the rights of any person
entitled to damages under existing law.
(b) Nothing contained in this article shall impair any right of indemnity or
subrogation under existing law.
2. N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAW § 1401 (McKinney 1976).
3. 46 N.Y.2d 332, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 413 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1978).
4. Id. at 341, 385 N.E.2d at 1274, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
5. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 1401, C1401:4 (McKinney 1976). This comment
provides:
Nothing in the statute requires that the two defendants be liable upon the same
theory. All that is necessary is that they be "subject to liability for damages for
1
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court, however, permitted the contribution claim based on the
injury sustained by the defendant on the theory that the parent
breached an "independent duty" to the defendant.'
Walter Nolechek purchased a motorcycle for his 16-year-old
son, Scott.' He gave the unregistered vehicle to his son despite
Scott's severely impaired vision and lack of a driver's license.
Scott had undergone an operation for the removal of an eye; his
long-distance vision in the remaining eye was uncorrectable. 8
Scott died after the motorcycle he was operating9 collided with a
steel cable which was alleged to have been negligently suspended
across a roadway by two of the defendants to block off an area
the same . . . injury."
6. These diagrams illustrate the relationships of parent, child and defendant under
the contribution statute and as they existed in Nolechek.
Statute Nolechek
Contribution Model Model
Child 
Child
"[Lliability for 
a Cild
damages for the missing g liability for in-
same personal in- link** 0 jury to child
liability~ for ijr odfna
Z7af
libiit for injury to \ defendant
Parent A--------------Tortfeasor Parent 4 ----------------- Tortfeasor
contribution (defendant) contribution (defendant)
claim claim
*N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 1401 (McKinney 1976).
**In the Nolechek model, common liability for the child's injury is lacking.
7. Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 337, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 1271, 413 N.Y.S.2d
8. Nolechek v. Gesuale, 58 A.D.2d 885, 886, 396 N.Y.S.2d 881, 882 (2d Dep't 1977).
9. Prior to the accident, Scott had switched motorcycles with his friend, James Nie-
man. Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 337, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 1271, 413 N.Y.S.2d 340,
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across a roadway by two of the defendants to block off an area
used for mining.10 Walter Nolechek, individually and as admin-
istrator of his son's estate, commenced a wrongful death ac-
tion." The defendants counterclaimed against Nolechek for con-
tribution, alleging that Nolechek was negligent in providing his
handicapped son with a motorcycle. The Appellate Division dis-
missed the counterclaim on the ground that defendants had no
claim for apportionment of damages against the parent "where
10. Nolechek sued Thomas Gesuale and Star Sand and Gravel Co., who had sus-
pended the cable, the adjacent property owners, who had permitted the cable to be
erected, and the Town of Smithtown and its highway superintendent, who had not
required removal of the obstruction. Only Gesuale and Star Sand and Gravel were in-
volved in this appeal. Id. at 336-37, 385 N.E.2d at 1271, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
11. The following illustrates and explains the course of litigation in Nolechek v.
Gesuale.
/ Town of Smithtown
/
/
/ - Smithtown Highway Superintendent/ /
/ / -, Adjacent property owners
Walter Nolechek sued -- - Thomas Gesuale
Star Sand and Gravel Co.
counter-claimed
for contribution
third-party
complaint
James Neiman
Paul Neiman
Special Term denied motions by the Neimans to dismiss the counterclaim and third-
party complaint. On appeal by the Neimans, the Appellate Division reversed both deter-
minations and dismissed the counterclaim and third-party complaint. Gesuale and Star
appealed from the Appellate Division's order; Nolechek appealed from the dismissal of
the third-party complaint. The Court of Appeals reinstated the counterclaim and af-
firmed the dismissal of the third-party complaint. Id. at 336-337, 385 N.E.2d at 1271, 413
N.Y.S.2d at 342-43.
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peals reversed and reinstated defendants' counterclaim,13 pre-
mised on the parent's breach of a duty to protect third parties
from foreseeable harm resulting from the negligent entrustment
of a dangerous instrument to his child.14
Part I of this note explores the areas of law involved in the
Nolechek decision: New York's contribution statute, article 14 of
the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR);" New
York's rule that a child has no cause of action against his parent
for negligent supervision, the Holodook rule;' 6 and New York's
recognition of a parent's common-law duty to protect third par-
ties from foreseeable harm caused by his child's misuse of a dan-
gerous instrument.1 7 Parts II and III will discuss and analyze the
Nolechek decision. This note contends that the Court of Ap-
peals' reasoning is at odds with the contribution statute and
should be limited to the unique facts of the case. Further, this
note will suggest alternatives which the court could have used to
achieve an equitable result.
I. Background
A. Contribution in New York
Early New York law' s followed the English rule that there
could be no contribution among joint tortfeasors.1 9 Desire for
properly supervise him. An infant has no cause of action against a parent for lack of
proper supervision . . . ." Id.
13. Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 336, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 1271, 413 N.Y.S.2d
340, 343 (1978). The Court of Appeals upheld the Appellate Division's dismissal of
Nolechek's third-party claim against Scott's friend and his father, ruling that the ex-
change of the motorcycles was not the proximate cause of the accident and therefore
provided no basis for liability. Id. at 341, 385 N.E.2d at 1274, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
14. Id. at 338-39, 385 N.E.2d at 1272-73, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 344-45.
15. See note 1 supra.
16. Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974).
See notes 50-55 and accompanying text infra.
17. See notes 56-70 and accompanying text infra.
18. For discussions of the development of contribution in New York, see, e.g., Sur-
vey of New York Practice Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: A Revolution in New York Law, 47
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 185 (1972); Note, The New Right of Relative Contribution: Dole v.
Dow Chemical Co., 37 ALs. L. Rv. 154 (1972); 41 FORDHAM L. Rv. 167 (1972).
19. Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799) is commonly cited as
expressing the general rule against contribution; but see Note, Contribution Between
Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARv. L. REv. 176
(1898), which expresses the view that Merryweather did not state the general rule, but
[Vol. 1:453
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more equitable loss distribution among tortfeasors 0 led to the
enactment, in 1928, of a contribution statute.21 This statute al-
lowed a codefendant a cause of action for contribution after a
finding of common liability for a money judgment and payment
by him of more than his pro rata share. While the statute per-
mitted limited equitable loss distribution, courts and commenta-
tors criticized 22 it for permitting a plaintiff to determine the ex-
tent and availability of contribution by his willingness to sue
more than one tortfeasor.a
Courts responded to the limited availability of contribution
by permitting the named defendant to implead a nonparty for
the exception, in that the Merryweather holding applied to intentional tortfeasors. A
principal New York case which adopted the rule of Merryweather was Peck v. Ellis, 2
Johns. Ch. 131 (N.Y. 1816). For a discussion of other early contribution cases, see Note,
Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence-Merryweather v.
Nixan, 12 HAsv. L. Rav. 176 (1898).
The courts' unwillingness to allow contribution was based on their refusal to aid
wrongdoers in pari delicto, reluctance to apportion degrees of negligence among
tortfeasors, and belief that a policy against contribution would deter wrongful conduct.
See id.
20. See Note, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 47 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 815, 818 (1972).
21. Law of March 28, 1928, ch. 714, 211-a, [1928] N.Y. Laws 1549 (repealed 1962).
Where a money judgment has been recovered jointly against two or more defen-
dants in an action for a personal injury or for property damage, and such judg-
ment has been paid in part or in full by one or more of such defendants, each
defendant who has paid more than his own pro rata share shall be entitled to
contribution from the other defendants with respect to the excess so paid over and
above the pro rata share of the defendant or defendants making such payments;
provided, however, that no defendant shall be compelled to pay to any other such
defendant an amount greater than his pro rata share of the entire judgment. Such
recovery may be had in a separate action; or where the parties have appeared in
the original action a judgment may be entered by one such defendant against the
other by motion on notice.
This statute was repealed and re-enacted without substantial change as section 1401 of
the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. CIVwi PRAcTicE LAW AND RuLEs, ch. 308, §
1401, [19621 N.Y. Laws 653 (repealed 1974). This section was later repealed and the
current section 1401 was enacted in 1974. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 1401 (McKinney 1976).
For the current text of this section, see note 1 supra.
22. See Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 148-49, 282 N.E.2d 288, 291-92, 331
N.Y.S.2d 382, 386-87 (1972); Note, The New Right of Relative Contribution: Dole v.
Dow Chemical Co., 37 ALB. L. Riy. 154, 156. For a discussion of various unsuccessful
attempts by defendants to bring third-party actions, see id. at 156-57.
23. If plaintiff sued only one tortfeasor, the named defendant could neither implead
another tortfeasor nor sue for contribution in a separate action. 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 167,
167 (1972).
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purposes of indemnification.2' Whereas contribution allowed
loss-sharing among defendants jointly liable to a plaintiff, in-
demnity allowed a court to shift the entire loss from one
tortfeasor to another.2 5 The right of indemnification arises when
one party has been compelled to pay for another's wrong.' 6 Con-
tribution and indemnity are doctrines based on considerations of
fairness.2 7 The right to contribution, however, derives from stat-
ute, 8 while the right to indemnification derives from a contract
implied in law,' 9 from an express contract,8 0 or from a statute
which so provides."1
Dissatisfaction with the limitations of contribution and in-
demnity' crystallized in the New York Court of Appeals'
landmark decision, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.35 The court abol-
24. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 150, 282 N.E.2d 288, 293, 331 N.Y.S.2d
382, 388-89 (1972) (citing 65 COLUM. L. REv. 123, 126 (1965)) "It has been observed that
the doctrine of indemnity 'evolved in the unnatural surroundings of an inflexible rule
against contribution'. . . ." Id.
25. See, e.g., W. PRossER, LAW OF TORTS § 51 (4th ed. 1971); McFall v. Compagnie
Maritime Beige, 304 N.Y. 314, 328, 107 N.E.2d 463, 471 (1952). "The right to indemnity,
as distinguished from contribution, is not dependent upon the legislative will. It springs
from a contract, express or implied, and ... reimbursement is sought." Id. See Putvin v.
Buffalo Elec. Co., 5 N.Y.2d 447, 158 N.E.2d 691, 186 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1959).
26. Margolin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 32 N.Y.2d 149, 152, 297 N.E.2d 80, 82, 344
N.Y.S.2d 336, 338 (1973); Taft v. Shaffer Trucking, 52 A.D.2d 255, 258, 383 N.Y.S.2d
744, 746 (4th Dep't 1976).
The New York courts traditionally denied indemnity where parties were found to
have been in pan delicto, equally culpable. As a result of this limitation, courts devel-
oped the active-passive theory of indemnity which allowed full indemnification of a pas-
sively negligent tortfeasor by one who was actively negligent. Courts and commentators
criticized this doctrine, as it involved the courts in weighing comparative degrees of neg-
ligence and its application was uncertain. See Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143,
148-49, 282 N.E.2d 288, 291-92, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 386-87 (1972); Bush Terminal Bldgs.
Co. v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 11 A.D.2d 220, 225, 202 N.Y.S.2d 172, 179 (1st Dep't 1960),
rev'd on other grounds, 9 N.Y.2d 426, 174 N.E.2d 516, 214 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1961).
27. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.YS.2d 382
(1972).
28. See notes 1 and 21 supra.
29. Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 130,
146 (1932).
30. The New York courts have recognized contracts by which the parties provide for
indemnification of liability for negligence. Rogers v. Dorchester Assoc., 32 N.Y.2d 553,
563-66, 297 N.E.2d 403, 408-10, 347 N.Y.S.2d 22, 30-32 (1973).
31. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50b (McKinney 1977).
32. See note 24 and accompanying text and note 26 supra.
33. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). In Dole, an employee
died after he inhaled a toxic fumigant used to spray a grain bin which he entered in the
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss2/12
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ished the active-passive test for indemnification" and held that
there could be apportionment of damages among tortfeasors.85
The Dole court expanded the availability of indemnification"
and foreshadowed a new rule of contribution. 7
In 1974, the New York legislature codified the Dole appor-
tionment rule by enacting CPLR article 14." The Judicial Con-
ference, in recommending passage of the contribution statute,
stated:
Because the "Dole claim" and this Article, are based upon the
contribution model, it is possible to define with some particularity
the relationship that must exist between the parties before the
right of contribution arises .... [I]t can be simply stated that
there shall be no right to contribution unless each of the parties
from whom it is sought is or was subject to liability for damages
for the same harm to the injured party.8 '
The Judicial Conference emphasized that the requirement of
course of his employment. His administratrix sued Dow, the manufacturer of the chemi-
cal, which brought a third-party claim seeking indemnification from the employer alleg-
ing that the employer's negligence was "active and primary" and that Dow's actions were
"passive and secondary." Id. at 146, 282 N.E.2d at 290, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
34. Id. at 148, 282 N.E.2d at 291-92, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387. See Green Bus Lines v.
Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 74 A.D.2d 136, 426 N.Y.S.2d 981 (2d Dep't 1980). For a
discussion of the active-passive test, see note 26 supra.
35. The Dole court held that
where a third party is found to have been responsible for a part, but not all, of the
negligence for which a defendant is cast in damages, the responsibility for that
part is recoverable by the prime defendant against the third party. To reach that
end there must necessarily be an apportionment of responsibility in negligence
between those parties.
Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 148, 282 N.E.2d 288, 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 387
(1972).
36. The Dole court wrote: "There are circumstances which would justify apportion-
ment of responsibility between third-party plaintiff and third-party defendant, in effect
a partial indemnification." Id. at 147, 282 N.E.2d at 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 386. See Green
Bus Lines v. Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 74 A.D.2d 136, 426 N.Y.S.2d 981 (2d Dep't
1980).
37. In Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 286 N.E.2d 241, 334
N.Y.S.2d 851 (1972), the court referred to the rule of Dole as one of "relative contribu-
tion" which "permits apportionment of damages among joint or concurrent tortfeasors
regardless of the degree or nature of the concurring fault." Id. at 29, 286 N.E.2d at 243,
334 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
38. For text of Civil Practice Law and Rules article 14, see note 1 supra.
39. TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE TO THE LEGISLATURE ON
THE CvaL PRAcTrcz LAw AND RuLmS (1974), reprinted in [19741 N.Y. Laws 1808
(McKinney).
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common liability is "considered essential in a contribution
statute.
4 °
Although the Dole decision was based on indemnity, it pro-
foundly influenced the law of contribution in New York. The
Dole court clouded the differences between contribution and in-
demnity; the Court of Appeals, however, has since reaffirmed the
distinctions.41 Contribution now encompasses more claims than
in the past. The party against whom contribution is claimed
need not have been named in plaintiff's action, 2 and the
amount of contribution is no longer determined by a defendant's
pro rata share.48 Rather, a tortfeasor is liable for his equitable
share of a judgment. The fundamental principles of common
law indemnity are still viable; a court, however, is no longer lim-
ited to an all-or-nothing result based on the active-passive test.
The courts may grant full indemnification under traditional in-
demnification theory, partial indemnification under Dole, or
none at all.
B. Parental Immunity from Liability for Negligent Supervi-
sion in New York
In 1969, the Court of Appeals, in Gelbman v. Gelbman,"
abolished New York's judge-made rule of intrafamilial immunity
for nonwillful torts. 7 The holding exposed family members to
40. That the "Dole claim" is dependent on such a finding is vividly demon-
strated in Margolin v. New York Life Insurance Co., 32 N.Y.2d 149 (1973). The
Court of Appeals there held that where the injured party sued two alleged
tortfeasors, and the jury found only one liable to the plaintiff, that tortfeasor's
cross claim for a Dole apportionment must fail ...
Id. at 1808-09.
41. Rogers v. Dorchester Assocs., 32 N.Y.2d 553, 300 N.E.2d 403, 347 N.Y.S.2d 22
(1973).
42. See note 1 supra. Despite these changes, a plaintiff may still collect his full
damages from one defendant if the other "apportionment" defendants do not pay. Kelly
v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 286 N.E.2d 241, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851 (1972).
43. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
44. See notes 1 & 36 and note 35 and accompanying text supra.
45. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382
(1972). Awards of partial indemnification may be made in worker's compensation cases.
Note that Dole itself involved a worker's compensation situation. See note 33 supra.
46. 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969). In Gelbman, the court
held that a parent could maintain an action against her 16-year-old son for injuries sus-
tained in an accident during which she was a passenger in a car driven by her son.
47. This rule was first established in Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248 N.Y. 626, 162
[Vol. 1:453
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tort liability for "acts which if done by one ordinary person to
another would be torts."4 This ruling, in conjunction with the
subsequent Dole40 decision and the revision of the contribution
statute, created the possibility of third-party claims against a
parent. A tortfeasor, potentially liable for injuries to a child,
could seek contribution or apportionment from a parent based
on his negligent supervision of his child.
The Court of Appeals, in Holodook v. Spencer,50 recognized
this problem51 and held that a child has no cause of action
against a parent for negligent supervision. 52 The court reasoned,
therefore, that a tortfeasor sued for injuries to the child cannot
claim contribution or apportionment from the parent. 8 The
court was concerned with the potential impact of Dole on the
parent-child relationship and reasserted New York's "policies of
promoting family harmony. ' ' " This exception to the Gelbman
rule was based on several considerations: vulnerability to suit
might result in parental reluctance to prosecute actions on be-
half of the child; liability for contribution might cause in-
N.E. 551 (1928). The court reaffirmed the rule in Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 40
N.E.2d 236 (1942), which recognized the wide range of discretion afforded to parents in
the rearing of their children, and in Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 174 N.E.2d 718,
215 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1961), which announced that the intrafamilial immunity rule is neces-
sary to preserve family harmony and "[is] a concept that cannot be rejected without
changing the whole fabric of our society, a fundamental idea that is at the bottom of all
community life." Id. at 474, 173 N.E.2d at 719, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 36-37.
Sorrentino, Cannon, and Badigian involved suits brought by a child against his par-
ent for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident. GeIbman involved a par-
ent's suit against her child for injuries sustained as a result of the child's negligent oper-
ation of a motor vehicle. Although the situations were similar, the result in Gelbman was
different.
48. See Smith v. Sapienza, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 30, 1981, at 28, col. 1 (N.Y. Ct. App. Jan.
15, 1981).
49. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382
(1972). See notes 33-37 and accompanying text supra.
50. 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974). Holodook was a consoli-
dation of three cases. In the main case, a child who darted out from between two parked
cars was hit by an automobile. The father, individually and on behalf of his child, sued
the driver. Defendant sought Dole apportionment or contribution by impleader and
counterclaim; he alleged that the parents had been negligent in supervising the child,
and that their negligence contributed to the cause of the accident.
51. Id. at 51, 324 N.E.2d at 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 871.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 44-45, 324 N.E.2d at 342-43, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
54. Id. at 48, 324 N.E.2d at 344, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 869. See cases cited in note 47
supra.
9
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trafamilial strife; and since the family is regarded as an eco-
nomic unit, recovery from the parent would diminish the child's
recovery.55
C. A Parent's Duty to Third Parties to Protect Them from
Harm Resulting from his Child's Misuse of a Dangerous
Instrument
Ordinarily, a parent is not liable for his child's torts; the
parent and child are considered separate legal beings." At com-
mon law57 and in New York, 8 however, a parent has a duty to
protect third parties from harm caused by a child's possession,
operation or use of a dangerous instrument which the parent
negligently entrusted to the child. A parent is assumed to have
the power to control his child; he has a duty to exercise that
power for the protection of others ." There is no precise defini-
55. Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 47, 324 N.E.2d 338, 354, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859,
868-69 (1974). The court also noted the potential for abuse of a negligent supervision
claim by estranged parents when one might sue the other. on the child's behalf or by the
child suing the parent upon reaching the age of majority. Id. The court observed that
[o]f the many duties arising from the parent-child relation, only very few give rise
to legal consequences for their breach. Parents are obligated in accordance with
their means to support and maintain their children-i.e., to furnish adequate
food, clothing, shelter, medical attention and education. A parent's failure to ob-
serve minimum standards of care in performing these duties entails both remedial
sanctions, such as forfeiture of custody, and criminal sanctions. Parents are also
obligated to provide proper guidance and guardianship of their children and are
vulnerable to legal sanction for failure to meet minimum standards of care, for
example, by the excessive infliction of corporal punishment, by the excessive use
of drugs or alcohol, or by directing or authorizing a child under 16 to engage in an
occupation involving substantial risk of danger to his life or health. Parents are
also obligated to supervise their children. Failure to supervise may entail legal
consequence where injury to a third party results, for example, under circum-
stances where a parent negligently entrusts to his child a dangerous instrument, or
an instrument potentially dangerous in the child's hands, so as to create an unrea-
sonable risk to others.
Id. at 44-45, 324-N.E.2d at 342-43, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 866 (citations omitted).
56. W. PROSSER, supra note 25, at 871. See LeSauvage v. Freedman, 100 Misc. 2d
857, 860, 419 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1021 (1979). But see N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-112 (McKin-
ney 1980) (limited liability of parents or certain legal guardians having custody of an
infant for malicious and destructive acts of such infant).
57. W. PROSSER, supra note 25, at 872. See Frankel, Parental Liability for a Child's
Tortious Acts, 81 DICK. L. REv. 755, 759 (1977).
58. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Cauchois, 249 A.D. 518, 293 N.Y.S. 147 (2d Dep't 1937);
Beekman Estate v. Midonick, 44 Misc. 2d 11, 252 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
59. W. PROSSER, supra note 25, at 872. See also Carmona v. Padilla, 4 A.D.2d 181,
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss2/12
1981] NOLECHEK V. GESUALE
tion of a dangerous instrument; instead, a court will consider the
circumstances of the case. 0 A court will examine such factors as
the child's propensities," his age and intelligence, 2 and his past
misuse of the instrument,63 as well as the inherent danger of the
instrument.8 " This rule has been applied where the parent knew
or should have known that the instrument was likely to cause
harm to others." Thus, courts have allowed actions against a
parent for his child's misuse of matches,6" a motorized bicycle,67
a baseball bat,68 a bow and arrow,69 and a B-B gun. 70
II. The Court's Opinion in Nolechek v. Gesuale
In Nolechek, a divided Court of Appeals 7' allowed the de-
fendant to seek contribution from the parent even though the
parent owed no duty to his child.7 2 The court considered al-
lowing a child a cause of action against his parent for the negli-
183, 163 N.Y.S.2d 741, 743 (1st Dep't 1957).
60. See Carmona v. Padilla, 4 A.D.2d 181, 183, 163 N.Y.S.2d 741, 743 (1st Dep't
1957).
61. Steinberg v. Cauchois, 249 A.D. 518, 519, 293 N.Y.S. 147, 149 (2d Dep't 1937).
62. Masone v. Gianotti, 54 A.D.2d 269, 273, 388 N.Y.S.2d 322, 324 (2d Dep't 1976).
63. Agnesini v. Olsen, 277 A.D. 1006, 100 N.Y.S.2d 338 (2d Dep't 1950).
64. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hunter, 63 A.D.2d 200, 201-02, 406 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626
(3d Dep't 1978).
65. See Lalomia v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co., 35 A.D. 114, 312 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (2d
Dep't 1970).
66. Agnesini v. Olsen, 277 A.D. 1006, 100 N.Y.S.2d 338 (2d Dep't 1950) (cause of
action allowed for a fire started by a four-year-old with a known propensity to light
matches).
67. Lalomia v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co., 35 A.D.2d 114, 312 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (2d
Dep't 1970) (a motorized bicycle operated by a twelve-year-old collided with an automo-
bile causing his death and that of the automobile driver).
68. Zuckerberg v. Munzer, 277 A.D. 1061, 100 N.Y.S.2d 910 (2d Dep't 1950) (cause
of action allowed for assault with a baseball bat by an eight-year-old child whose parent
knew of the child's violent tendencies).
69. Carmona v. Padilla, 4 A.D.2d 181, 163 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1st Dep't 1957) (cause of
action permitted against a grandparent who allowed her young grandchild to play with a
bow and arrow, thereby injuring another child).
70. Lichtenthal v. Gawoski, 44 A.D.2d 771, 354 N.Y.S.2d 267 (4th Dep't 1974) (cause
of action allowed against the parent of a child who injured plaintiff's son with a B-B
gun).
71. Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 413 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1978).
Judge Breitel wrote the majority opinion in which Judges Jason, Jones and Wachtler
joined. Judge Gabrielli and Judge Fuchsberg wrote separate concurring opinions. Judge
Cooke dissented.
72. Id. at 341, 385 N.E.2d at 1274, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
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gent entrustment of a dangerous instrument.73 Judge Breitel
viewed this proposal as "neither analytically persuasive nor
practically sound," however, and reaffirmed the Holodook ratio-
nale allowing broad parental discretion in child-rearing; 4 per-
mitting a child to use instruments such as power tools,
motorcycles or automobiles is a proper exercise of parental
judgment.75
The court sustained defendants' counterclaim for contribu-
tion based on the parent's breach of an independent duty to
protect the defendants from foreseeable harm caused by the
child's misuse of a dangerous instrument.76 The court stated
that this independent duty is analogous to the duty found in
cases involving worker's compensation, in which a defendant
may claim contribution or indemnity from the employer despite
plaintiff employee's inability to sue the employer directly.76 Em-
phasizing that parental liability arises from a duty owed to third
parties and not from a duty to protect his child, Judge Breitel
reasoned:
However the children are raised, there must be respect for the
hazards created for third parties. Parents are permitted to dele-
gate to their children the decision to participate in dangerous
activities, but they are not absolved from liability for harm in-
curred by third parties when the parents as adults unreasonably,
with respect to such third parties, permit their children to use
dangerous instruments.79
The court acknowledged that physical harm is ordinarily associ-
ated with tort injury; it concluded, however, that liability for
damages is also harm for which the parent ought to be responsi-
73. Id. at 337-38, 385 N.E.2d at 1271-72, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 344.
74. Id. For discussion of Holodook, see notes 50-55 and accompanying text supra.
75. Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 338, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 1271, 413 N.Y.S.2d
340, 344 (1978).
76. Id. at 341-42, 385 N.E.2d at 1274, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
77. Id. at 339, 385 N.E.2d at 1272-73, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 345. See Westchester Light-
ing Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938);
Briscoe v. Williams, 50 A.D.2d 883, 377 N.Y.S.2d 163 (2d Dep't 1975). See note 45 supra.
78. N.Y. WORK. Comp. LAW §§ 10-11 (McKinney 1965). See text accompanying
notes 90-91 infra.
79. Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 339, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 1272, 413 N.Y.S.2d
340, 344-45 (1978).
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ble.80 The court wrote, "A parent who entrusts an infant child
with a dangerous instrument creates a danger to all society. It
would be repulsive to permit, under the guise of protecting in-
trafamily relations, such a parent to escape all liability to a 'con-
current' tort-feasor who suffers financial harm. . .. "81
In his concurring opinion, Judge Gabrielli pointed out that
"the well-established rule under Dole .. .precludes the coun-
terclaim unless we also recognize the existence of a cause of ac-
tion by the child against the parent."' 2 He favored creating an
exception to Holodook8s by allowing a child a cause of action
against his parent "[w]here the instrument given to the child is
so obviously capable of causing harm to the child that the pa-
rental behavior can be classified as wanton, willful, or gross
negligence."84
Judge Fuchsberg, concurring in result only, criticized the
majority for reaffirming Holodook and stretching the principles
of foreseeability and proximate cause.86 He advocated instead an
approach which would answer "the broad question at the heart
of negligence law: What would an ordinarily reasonable and pru-
dent person-taking into account the parent-child relation-
ship-have done in similar circumstances?"8'6 Judge Fuchsberg
reasoned that a "reasonable care under the circumstances" stan-
dard would be in harmony with general tort law principles and
would recognize the special nature of the parent-child
relationship.8 7
Judge Cooke agreed with the court's treatment of Holodook
but dissented strongly on the issue of contribution."8 He stated
80. Id. at 339, 385 N.E.2d at 1272-73, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
81. Id. at 341, 385 N.E.2d at 1274, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
82. Id. at 342, 385 N.E.2d at 1274, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 347 (Gabrielli, J., concurring).
For a discussion of Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., see notes 33-36 and accompanying text
supra.
83. See note 55 and accompanying text and text accompanying note 74 supra.
84. Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 342, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 1274-75, 413
N.Y.S.2d 340, 347 (1978) (Gabrielli, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 345-46, 385 N.E.2d at 1276-77, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 349 (Fuchsberg, J.,
concurring).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 346, 385 N.E.2d at 1277-78, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 349-50 (Fuchsberg, J.,
concurring).
88. Id. at 347, 385 N.E.2d at 1278, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 350 (Cooke, J., dissenting). Judge
Cooke said, "Because such a holding marks a sudden, unexplained departure from prior
.1981]
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that according to CPLR 1401 there can be no contribution ab-
sent "common liability."8 9 Judge Cooke argued that the worker's
compensation analogy relied on by the majority is not authority
for allowing a claim for contribution;90 the worker's compensa-
tion law is merely a statutory replacement for the employer's lia-
bility to the employee.91
Further, Judge Cooke criticized the majority for creating a
new tort cause of action by their holding that a parent breaches
a duty to a third party when that party's only injury is exposure
to liability. 92 Judge Cooke contended, "[A]n action to recover
such damages has never been cognizable in our legal system, and
runs contrary to the settled principle that a negligent breach of
duty does not give rise to a liability unless it proximately causes
injury. ' 'g
Judge Cooke was also concerned that allowing a defendant
to counterclaim might result in a parent's failing to prosecute
his child's cause of action." Judge Cooke concluded that the
court's decision singled out for special treatment the parent of a
handicapped child, by placing another burden on that parent.95
V. Analysis
While the Nolechek court endeavored to reach a just result,
its decision presents several analytical problems. By allowing de-
fendants' counterclaim, the court departed from contribution
well-reasoned decisions, I must dissent." Id.
89. Id. at 348, 385 N.E.2d at 1278, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 350-51.
90. Id. at 348-49, 385 N.E.2d at 1278, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 351. See note 45 and text
accompanying note 77 supra.
91. N.Y. WORK. Comp. LAW §§ 10, 11 (McKinney 1965).
92. Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 349, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 1279, 413 N.Y.S.2d
340, 351 (1978) (Cooke, J., dissenting).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 349, 385 N.E.2d at 1279, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 351-52.
95. Id. at 350, 385 N.E.2d at 1279, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 352.
'The parent of a blind or crippled or retarded child has burdens enough without
being singled out for a special additional monetary liability which the parents
blessed with normal children would not confront. *** A rule which would carve
out a special exception for the parent already stricken with the burden of a seri-
ously handicapped child, not to ease that parent's path but to place yet another
obstacle on it, lacks compassion.'
Id. (quoting N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAW § 3019, C3019:42 at 253 (McKinney 1974)).
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principles. As Judges Cooke" and Gabrielli 97 noted, Dole v. Dow
Chemical Co.9 and its progeny, New York's contribution stat-
ute99 and its legislative history'00 are in agreement that a party
may claim contribution only from a person who has breached a
duty owed to the injured party. This requirement of common
liability goes to the heart of a contribution claim, since contribu-
tion is a sharing of liability. The majority, however, never men-
tioned any of these contribution principles; neither did they cite
CPLR 1401. Dismissing the issue, Judge Breitel stated, "It mat-
ters not that the parent would not be liable to his child in an
action for personal injuries; the financial harm suffered by the
third party results from a legally cognizable breach of duty dif-
ferent in kind from any moral breach of duty to the child."' '
Neither was the majority's analogy to the worker's compen-
sation cases appropriate. An employer owes a duty of care to his
employee; the worker's compensation law merely defines the em-
ployee's remedy.10 2 As the Nolechek majority reaffirmed, a par-
ent owes no duty to protect his child from harm caused by negli-
gent supervision or negligent entrustment of a dangerous
instrument. Thus, the analogy is unsound.
One of the principal problems presented by the Nolechek
decision is the court's failure to distinguish between contribu-
tion and indemnity.108 The applicability of the "independent
duty" rationale used by the court is questionable in a contribu-
tion context. This rationale has traditionally been a basis for in-
96. Id. at 348, 385 N.E.2d at 1278, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 350-51 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 342, 385 N.E.2d at 1274, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 347 (Gabrielli, J., concurring).
98. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
99. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw art. 14 (McKinney 1976). See also note 1 supra.
100. See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
101. Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 339, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 1272, 413 N.Y.S.2d
340, 345 (1978). But cf. Judge Breitel's opinion in Rogers v. Dorchester Assocs., 32
N.Y.2d 553, 564, 300 N.E.2d 403, 409, 347 N.Y.S.2d 22, 31 (1973). "The rule of appor-
tionment applies when two or more tort-feasors have shared, albeit in various degrees, in
the responsibility by their conduct or omissions in causing an accident, in violation of
the duties they respectively owed to the injured person." Id.
102. See notes 77-78 and accompanying text supra; see Briscoe v. Williams, 50
A.D.2d 883, 883, 337 N.Y.S.2d 163, 164 (2d Dep't 1975).
103. The court initially stated the issue as whether the defendants could "seek in-
demnity or contribution." Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 336, 385 N.E.2d 1268,
1270, 413 N.Y.S.2d 340, 343 (1978).
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demnification, 0 not contribution. One interpretation of the
court's decision is that the defendants are entitled to indemnifi-
cation rather than contribution. Dole and the contribution stat-
ute preserve a right to implead one who is or may be liable for
indemnification in whole or in part.10 5 Understood in this fash-
ion, Judge Breitel's analysis is more logically consistent, pre-
serves intact the Holodook rule, and respects the distinctions be-
tween contribution and indemnity. Judge Breitel, however,
failed to articulate clearly an indemnification analysis.1
Further, it is not clear that the parent actually breached
this "independent duty" as defendants' "injury" was liability for
damages, not injury to his person or property. 10 7 Judge Breitel
apparently expanded tort damages concepts to include economic
detriment. Traditionally, recovery for financial loss of this sort
has been allowed under contract or quasi-contract theories and
not under tort theory. By allowing the third party to claim tort
liability as a damage, the court appears to be creating a new
cause of action in tort.10 8 The court did not deal with this prob-
lem adequately when it stated that "[ilt may not be concluded,
as a matter of law, that the risk of a third party's tort liability to
an injured child is not a foreseeable risk to such third parties
when a parent has negligently entrusted the child with a danger-
ous instrument."10 9 This logic assumes that potential monetary
liability is a cognizable basis of a claim in tort and ignores the
issue of proximate cause.
While the court may have achieved an equitable result in
the particular circumstances of this case, the decision creates the
possibility of future inequities. If the injured child survives, a
104. See Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382
(1972); Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N.Y.
175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938).
105. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §1404 (McKinney 1976), Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30
N.Y.2d 143, 149, 282 N.E.2d 288, 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 387 (1972).
106. Judge Cooke stated that the court's opinion rested on contribution under Dole.
Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 347, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 1278, 413 N.Y.S.2d 340, 350
(1978) (Cooke J., dissenting).
107. See Lampman v. Cairo Cent. School Dist., 81 Misc. 2d 395, 366 N.Y.S.2d 579
(Sup. Ct. 1975).
108. Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 349, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 1279, 413 N.Y.S.2d
340, 351 (1978).
109. Id. at 340, 385 N.E.2d at 1273, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
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potential contribution claim against the parent may have several
undesirable results. A parent's fear of a counterclaim for contri-
bution may result in his failure to prosecute actions on his
child's behalf.110 Moreover, if the parent does sue on his child's
behalf and is liable for contribution, his liability will ultimately
diminish the child's recovery, since the family is generally a sin-
gle economic unit."' This result appears to benefit defendants
and their insurance companies at the expense of the child. The
family will also undergo emotional strain. Additionally, occa-
sions could arise in which such a cause of action could be used
abusively.11 2 The Holodook court considered these factors in
holding that a child has no cause of action against his parent for
negligent supervision. By permitting the contribution claim in
the dangerous instrument situation, the Nolechek court allows
the defendant to do indirectly what the child cannot do directly.
The Nolechek decision reflects the difficulty of harmonizing
the Holodook rule with the court's reluctance to allow the parent
to benefit from that immunity. Although the decision to entrust
a dangerous instrument is an element of parental discretion, the
Nolechek court implied that the parent had abused this discre-
tion."' The court was especially anxious to limit the parent's re-
covery since the parent, and not the deceased child, would have
been benefitted.114 These particular facts should have influenced
the court to limit its ruling to this case rather than to formulate
a general principle.
The court could have used other means to reach a fair result
in Nolechek. It could have adhered to the letter of the contribu-
tion statute and dismissed the defendant's counterclaim as fail-
ing to state a cause of action. The court could thus have avoided
the assumption of the legislature's prerogative. This result
110. "To. . . allow a tort-feasor to 'recover' for a parent's lapse of judgment where
the injured child himself cannot recover directly, can have no effect but to discourage
parents' active prosecution of their children's claims for fear of being held personally
liable." Holodook v. Spencer, 43 A.D.2d 129, 137, 350 N.Y.S.2d 199, 206 (3d Dep't 1973).
If the parent has no liability insurance, this deterrent will be stronger.
111. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
112. See notes 50-55 and accompanying text supra.
113. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
114. Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 341, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 1274, 413 N.Y.S.2d
340, 346 (1978).
1981]
17
PACE LAW REVIEW
would have been equitable. Under New York law, 16 the culpable
conduct of the decedent and the parties would have been consid-
ered by the trier of the facts in determining the defendants' final
liability."1"
Alternatively, the court could have made an exception to
the Holodook rule, recognizing a child's cause of action against
his parent for willful, wanton or gross negligence. This would al-
low recovery by the child and would "establish a minimal stan-
dard of care below which no one should be permitted to fall. 11 7
This exception could be justified on the ground that the parent
has temporarily abdicated his parental responsibilities and is no
longer deserving of immunity." 8 A defendant's claim for contri-
bution would then be consistent with the statutory require-
ments. While this proposal would raise the same problems ex-
amined in Holodook, " a court could find that willful, wanton or
gross parental negligence shifts the balance in favor of parental
liability and justifies this alternative. 120
The court could have gone even further and abolished the
Holodook rule. Recognizing a child's cause of action against his
parent for negligent supervision under a "standard of reasonable
care under the circumstances""' would result in consistent ap-
115. If a cause of action accrued before Sept. 1, 1975, the effective date of the com-
parative negligence statute, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW art. 14-A (McKinney 1976), contribu-
tory negligence could be pleaded as a defense. In Nolechek, the cause of action arose on
Sept. 30, 1973.
116. In fact, defendants had pleaded Scott's negligence as an affirmative defense in
their answer. Answer of Defendants 9, Exhibits at 34.
117. Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 343, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 1275, 413 N.Y.S.2d
340, 347 (1978) (Gabrielli, J., concurring).
118. The courts of other jurisdictions have relied on this rationale. See, e.g., Cowgill
v. Boock, 189 Or. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950); Hoffman v. Tracy, 67 W.2d 31, 406 P.2d 323
(1965).
119. See note 55 and accompanying text and text accompanying notes 110-112
supra.
120. Courts might prefer to limit this exception to wanton or willful conduct. One
writer has proposed a standard of "reckless disregard" which would hold a parent liable
for negligent supervision if his conduct is "more than a mistake resulting from inexperi-
ence or mere thoughtlessness, inadvertence, or simple inattention. In order to be entitled
to contribution under this standard, the defendant must prove that the parents failed to
adequately supervise their child despite an immediate foreseeable risk of injury." Note,
Negligent Parental Supervision as Grounds for Contribution in Tort: The Case for
Minimal Parental Liability, 12 U. CAL. D. L. REv. 828, 843 (1979).
121. Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 346, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 1277, 413 N.Y.S.2d.
340, 349 (1978).
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plication of the law of contribution and equitable consideration
of all parties. 22 Such an approach, however, would significantly
encroach on New York's policy of affording the parent broad
discretion in child rearing. As the Holodook court noted,
In most areas of tort law, the reasonable man standard well serves
the law's general aim of structuring human activity in accordance
with the community's understanding and expectations of proper
conduct. In the family relation between parent and child, how-
ever, we do not believe that application of this.standardized norm
is the wisest course. The result, we believe, would be to circum-
scribe the wide range of discretion a parent ought to have in per-
mitting his child to undertake responsibility and gain
independence. 23
Opportunities for abuse'24  of this cause of action, however,
would be more widespread than if the Holodook rule were
modified.
122. This would make New York one of several states which have abolished the rule
of intrafamily tort immunity and allow a cause of action for negligent supervision. These
states include: California (Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 476 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr.
288 (1971)), Hawaii (Peterson v. City and County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 383, 462 P.2d
1007 (1969)), and South Carolina (Elam v. Elam, 268 S.E.2d 109 (S.C. 1980)). Many
other states have modified the rule in various ways. For a discussion of the ways courts
have treated the doctrine, see Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 277 Kan. 758, 611 P.2d 135
(1980); Note, Negligent Parental Supervision as Grounds for Contribution in Tort: The
Case for Minimal Parental Liability, 12 U. CAL. D. L. REv. 828 (1979).
123. Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 49-50, 324 N.E.2d 338, 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d
859, 870-71 (1974).
The appellate division observed,
The duty to supervise a child in his daily activities has as its objective the foster-
ing of physical, emotional and intellectual development, and is one whose enforce-
ment can depend only on love. Each child is different, as is each parent; as to the
former some are to be pampered while some thrive on independence; as to the
latter, some trust in their children to use care, others are very cautious. Consider-
ing the different economic, educational, cultural, ethnic and religious backgrounds
which must prevail, there are so many combinations and permutations of parent-
child relationships that may result that the search for a standard would necessa-
rily be in vain-and properly so. Supervision is uniquely a matter for the exercise
of judgment. For this reason parents have always had the right to determine how
much independence, supervision and control a child should have, and to best
judge the character and extent of development of their child.
Holodook v. Spencer, 43 A.D.2d 129, 135, 350 N.Y.S.2d 199, 204-05 (3d Dep't 1973).
124. See note 55 supra.
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VI. Conclusion
The Nolechek decision is an attempt to harmonize several
areas of law to achieve a desired result. In its holding, the court
ignores the contribution statute, reinterprets contribution the-
ory, and expands a parent's duty to third parties. This approach
abandons the certainty of statute and defined rules of law for
the undefined, territory of ad hoc decisionmaking.
The court's "independent duty" rationale, while recognizing
a parent's responsibility to prevent harm from his child's misuse
of dangerous instruments, cannot support a contribution claim,
as it does not supply the missing link - common liability.1 25
Further, the court's ruling that liability for damages is "injury"
presents analytical problems involving the definition of duty and
considerations of foreseeability and proximate cause. Practically,
the court invites a new range of claims for tort liability, claims it
seems unlikely the court meant to encourage.
The court's strict adherence to the Holodook rule makes a
solution difficult. Abrogation of this rule in favor of a reasonable
man standard would be consistent with contribution principles
and theories of tort liability. Modification of the Holodook rule,
allowing a child a cause of action against his parent for wanton,
willful or gross negligence, would also be consistent with contri-
bution concepts. This would allow broad protection of parental
discretion, while recognizing that certain conduct justifies the
parent's loss of immunity.
Such departures remain unlikely, given the court's adher-
ence, in Nolechek, to the policies embodied in Holodook. While
the Nolechek court explored these alternatives, ultimately it re-
treated from any broad revision. Thus, the issues Nolechek
raised remain unresolved, and its holding should be confined to
its "rather unique circumstances.'"1
Sandra B. Edlitz
125. See note 6 supra.
126. Smith v. Sapienza, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 30, 1981, at 28, col. 1 (N.Y. Ct. App. Jan. 15,
1981).
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